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I.  Introduction 
I  propose  to  take  advantage  of  the  presence  of  so  many 
distinguished  and  influential  people  gathered  here  today  to 
consider  some  very  fundamental  questions  :  What  is  the  purpose 
of  competition  policy  ?  What  is  the  Commission's  competition 
policy  ?  What  does  the  C~mmission  intend  to  achieve  with  it  ? 
How  does  the  Commission  intehd  to  achieve  the  goals  it  has  set 
itself  ? 
This  does  indeed  seem  to  be  an  appropriate  moment  to  be  posing 
these  questions.  We  are  still  in  the  most  serious  recession 
since  the  war  and  this  is  bringing  about  a  number  of  fundamental 
social  and  economic  changes.  The  most  painful  symptom  of  which 
is  of  course  very  high  and  mounting  unemployment. 
In  the  Us  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  blame  antitrust  ~-~1cy 
for  many  of  our  economic  ills  and  this  view  has  found  sympathy 
with  the  current  US  administration.  It  has  not  found  sympathy 
with  the  European  Commission. 
There  has  also  beer  growing  pressure  on  competition  policy  in 
the  EEC.  Mr.  Dekker  the  President  of  Philips,  has  even  called  for 
a  rewriting  of  the  comp~ititon  rules  of  the  Treaty  (at  the  Europea· 
Management  Forum  ·symposium  at  Daves).  I  intend  to  show  you  that 
such  talk  is  misguided  and  that,  far  from  amending  the  Treaty, 
the  Trea'  ·  provides  s~ill  an  appropriate  basis  for  an  updated 
competition  policy. 
• •• I . • • 2. 
I  shall  therefore  first  explain  the  Commission's  views  on  the 
purpose  and  function  of  competition  and  competition  policy, 
secondly  consider  the  importance  of  co~petition during  a  rec~ssion 
and  finally  explain  the  means  by  which  we  are  using  competition 
policy  to  resolve  our  economic  problems. 
II.  The  purpose  and  functions  of  competition  and  competition 
policy. 
A  competition  as  a  fundamental  constituent  part  of  our  economic 
system. 
It  is  clear  from  a  reading  of  the  T~aty of  Rome  that  the  Community 
is  essentially  based  on  a  market  economy  in  which  fair  and  un-
distorted  competition  has  a  fundamental  role  to  play. 
Its  functions  are 
-to ensure  that  available  resources  are  allocated  tv 
the  most  productive  sectors; 
- to  stimulate  undertakings  to  make  the  best  use  of  their 
knowhow  and  skills  and 
- to  encourage  them  to  invent,  develop  and  exploit 
efficiently  new  techniques  and  new  products. 
We  firmly  believe  that  competition  is  the  best  stimulant  of  econo-
mic  activity  since  it  guarantees  the  widest  possible  freedom  of 
action  to  all.  An  active  competition  policy  pursued  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  makes  it  easier  for  the  supply 
and  demand  structures  continually  to  adjust  to technological 
development. 3. 
Through  the  interplay  of  decentralized  decision-making  m~inery, 
competition  enables  and  obliges  enterprises  continuously  to~\ 
improve  their  efficiency,  which  is  the  sine  qua  non  for  a 
jmprovement  in  living  standards  and  e~ployment prospects  wit~fn 
the  countries  of  the  Community.  From  this  point  of  view,  , 
competition  policy  is  an  essential  means  for  satisfying  to  a 
great  extent  the  individual  and  collective  needs  of  our  society. 
It  is  a  measure  of  the  importance  which  the  Community  attaches 
to  competition  policy  that  this  is  the  one  area  in  which  the 
Commission  has  its  own  autonomous  powers  of  decision-making. 
What  then  is  the•competition  policy  which  the  Commission  is 
pursuing  ? 
In  a  phrase,  it  is  the  maintenance  and  reinforcement  of  an 
effective  competitive  structure  in  the  Common  Market. 
We  .are  facing  a  _process  of  desindustrialisation  in  the  EEC, 
or  at  least  in  important  parts  of  it.  This  cannot  be  the  fate 
of  this  highly  developed  part  of  the  world,  and  we  must  reverse 
this  tendancy. 
We  want  to  press  the  competition  policy  into  the  service  of  the 
creation  of  a  new- European  industrial  structure.  This  means 
avoiding  the  artificial  protection  of  old  structu1es  and  favourin1 
; 
the  develon~ent  of  a  ~0  ~etitive  industrial  and  distribution 
pattern.  It  wilt  permit  us  to  keep  our  borders  open  and  to 
•' 
contribute  to  free  world  trade,  whilst  serving  at  the  same  time 
the  interests  of  our  consumers. 
• • ...  I  ..  - -4. 
Our  competition  policy  is  influenced  by  a  number  of  other 
factors  which  distinguish  it  from  the  competition  policies• 
of  other  authorities.  First  and  foremost  is  the  overriding  aim 
of  the  Community,  the  competition  and  reinforcement  of  a  single 
unified  internal  market.  Secondly  there  is  the  fact  that  in 
the  EEC  we  also  have  national  comp~ition policies.  There  are 
many  enforcement  tasks  which  we  can  - and  indeed  must  - leave 
to  the  national  competition  authorities.  I  a~  thinking  here  of 
restrictions  which  do  not  affect  trade  between  member  states. 
Finally  there  is  the  fact  that,  unique  among  all  competition 
authorities  in. the  world,  we  also  have  the  task  of  policing 
state  aids  granted  by  the  member  states  to  ensure  that  they 
do  not  distort  competition. 
.  .. 
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So  much  for  a  general  description  of  the  aims  of  our  competition 
policy.  I  shall  later  describe  the  means  by  which  this  policy 
is  translated  into 
action  but  first  I  would  like  to  deal  with  the  question  of 
the  relevance  of  competition  policy  i~  a  recession  and 
comment  on  the  attack  to  which  the  philosophy  I  have  outlined 
above  is  now  subject. 
III  Should  the  Rigour  of  Competition  Policy  Follow  the  Business 
Cycle 
For  the  fourth  seccisive  year  Europe  is  going  through  its 
worst  retession  since  the  war.  Let  me  give  you  some  facts 
figuring  in  the  Commission's  recently  published  annual  economi'c 
Report  for  1982,- 1983.  They  are  not  cheerful  news. 
Despite  the  forecast  recovery  for  the  second  half  of  198~ 
this  year  was  characterized  by  stagnation  with  a  growth  rate 
ot  only  0.3  %.  Ther- has  been  a  (limited)  success  in  the 
struggle  against  inflation  but  unemployment  has  continued 
,. 
to  increase  sharply  and  is  now  11.5  million.  Zero-growth 
led  in  most  member  states  to  a  shortfall  in  tax  revenues 
and  an  increase  in  unemployment  payments.  The  rapid  increase 
in  debt  service  costs  is  adding  pressure ·to  the  budget 
defic;ts.  The  general  climate  of  uncertainty  and  pessimism 
has  been  reinforced  particularly  by  the  extremely  high  level 
of  world  1nterest  Rate~  and  has  postponed  many  investment 
decisions  of  undertakings  in  Europe.  Despite  an  improvement 
in  the  Community's  terms  of  trade,  two  worrying  facts  show 
that  there  is  a  danger  of  Europe  has  entered  a  long 
,_ 6. 
period  of  zero  - growth  or  even  depression  :  On  the  one 
hand  we  are  facing  an  increasing  number  of  external  system 
shocks,  such  as  oil  shocks,  major  disturbances  in  world 
financial  markets  and  political  conflicts.  On  the  other 
hand  we  begin  to  understand  that  a  lot  of  necessary  adjust-
ments  whith  have  not  taken  place  are  accumulating  and  that 
6ur  economy  shows  a  growina  incapacity  to  respon~ quickly 
to  the  rapid  changes  in  the  economic  environment.  The  in-
creased  structural  rigidities  in  our  economics  have  pro-
foundly  changed  their  long-term  dynamism.  The  Special  Group 
•  of  the  Economic  Policy  Committee  and  Positive  Adjustment 
Policies  within~the  OECD  have  recently  come  to  the  same 
conclusions. 
The  depth  and  length  of  the  current  recession  are  lea~,ng  to 
increasing  pressure  on  competition  policy  and  the  view,  is 
gaining  ground  t:.at  competition  rules  should  not  apply  during 
' 
a  recession  or  should  be  applied  less  .·igorously.  It  is 
suggested  that,  in  many  sectors,  in  order  to  meet  the  com-
petitive  threat  from  outside  our  undertakings  should  be 
-- p rot  e c t e d ·  f rom  com p e t i t i on  f rom  e a c h  o t h e  r • 
I~  is  qu~te  natural  and  normal  that  such  pressures  should 
build  up  in  t~mes  of  r~cession.  In  boom  times  when  markets 
are  grow1ng  rapidly  and  profit  and  revenue  expectations  are 
high  there  is  enough  room  for  all  the  participants. Under-
takingg  therefore  concentrate  on  competing  and  trying  to 
conquer  as  great  a  share  of  the  market  as  possible. ------' 
..  ···---- ... -·-·····-·-·-···~---- --··· ---·  ·-. ------ -- --·--· ·-··--·-
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In  times  of  recession  the  desire  to  reduce  risks  and 
freeze  market  share  and  profit  increases  and  with  it, 
in  an  oligopolistic  world,  the  danger  of  ca~tellisation 
between  the  market  participants  grows  as  happened  in  the 
1930s.  It  is  thus  in  the  nature  of  things  that  the  work 
of  an  antftrust  authority  increases  in  times  of  recession. 
;: 
. 
The  Commission,  however,  does  not  believe  that  competition 
policy  only  has  a  part  to  play  when  the  barometer  is  set  at 
fair.  Quite  the  contrary  I  am  convinced  that  it  is  precisely 
~·  in  times  of  recession  that  competition  policy  has  an  impor-
tant  role  to  play.  The  stimulation  which  competition  provides 
to  adopt  to  changed  economic  circumstances  is  essential  to 
enable  undertc:',ings  to-recover,  retain  and  improve  their 
competitiveness.  Cartels,  on  the  other  hand  ossify  out-
dated  str~ctures,  lead  to  suboptimal  use  of  resources  and 
in  the  long  run  reduce  rather  than  increase  competitiveness. 
I  shall  now  explain  some  of  the  means  by  which  competition 
policy  is  being  used  to  contribute  to  resolution  of  problems. 
IV  The  Mr~ns  by  which  Competition  Policy  is  Contributing  to 
the  Resolutio~  ~f  pur  Economic  Difficulties 
I  have  so  fa~  been  speaking  in  generalities  and  perhaps 
some  of  you  have  been  wondering  how  exactly  and  c6ncretely 
compet~ .ion  policy  is  contributing  to  the  resolution  of  our 
economic  difficulties  ?  I  now  intend  to  answer  this  question. B. 
First  though,  what  exactly  are  the  root  causes  of  our  economic 
difficulties.  I  would  briefly  enumerate  them  as  follows 
First,  old  ossified  industrial  structures  which  are  in-
appropriate  to  the  changed  economic  circumstances  of  today. 
Secondly,  lack  of  sufficient  economics  of  scale  in  certain 
sectors  when  compared  with  our  international  competitors. 
...  Thirdly,  a  lack  of  ability  to  adapt  and  change  these  struc-
tures  to  the  needs  of  the  present  and  of  the  future. 
Fourthly,  lac~  of  investment  in  research  and  d~~~lopment 
in  growth  technologies. 
Fifthly,  overcap~city  in  some  sectors. 
Sixthly,  and  this  is  in  many  ways  a  consequence  of  other 
problems,  lack  of  competivity. 
'  ; 
Seventhly,  growing  protectionism  which  is  an  misguided  short-
sighted  reaction  to  our  other  problems  and  reduces  our  abili-
ty  to  adapt,. old  structures  and  develop  new  competitive 
; 
strucLUtes. 
Now  what  are  the  means  by  which  competition  policy  is  con-
tributing  to  a  resolution  of  these  problems.  I  shall  now 
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categories.  First,  instances  where  we  are  acting  to 
preserve  existing  competitive  structures  by  acting 
against  distortions  of  competition  and,  secondly,  instances· 
where  we  are  acting  to  create  the  conditions  necessary  for 
effective  competition  to  carry out  its  function. 
A.  Preservation  of  Existing  Competitive  Structures 
1.  State  Aids 
In  my  view  the  most  important  area  in  which  we  are  acting 
to  preserve  competitive  structures  and  prevent  distortions 
of  competition  is  in  connection  with  state  aids. 
As  the  recession  continues,  the  pressure  on  governments  to 
grant  support  to  undertakings  increases.  The  argument  is 
always  the  same.  Undertakings  and  jobs  must  be  preserved. 
'  A few  figures 'show  the  extent  to  which  the  number  of  state 
aids  has  increased.  The  number  of  proposed  aids  notified 
to  the  Commission  in  1976  was  45  and  in  1977  this  number 
had  increased  to  112.  By  1981  the  annual. number  of  notifications 
was  141  and  in  1982  it  had  reached  257  (of  which  133  were  in  the 
steel  sector  al~ne).  These  figures  include  general  aid  schemes 
and  are  there ;ore  no  indication  of  the  number  of  aided  under-
'  ,. 
takings. 
State  aids  can  usefully  contribute  to  the  facilitating  and 
smoothing  of  necessary  adaptation  to  changed  economic 
~c·i  rr:umc::t.:~nl"'t::.c '  ---... -... -.--·-----·--~~-~  ·--·---·~·· 
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industries  and  the  development  of  less  favoured  regions. 
However  they  can  also,  if  not  properly  controlled,  Lead 
to  ever  increasing  dependence  on  and  demand  for  aid. 
Aid  which  is  of  course  partly  financed  by  taxes  on 
healthy  undertakings.  Increasingly  we  are  finding  that 
aids  are  also  being  used  as  a  form  of  protectionism. 
They  protect  a  national  producer  from  competition  form 
outside  and  thus  delay  or  even  prevent  that  producer 
from  adapting  to  changed  market  conditions. '  -·---~-..  -·-------~--·-.. ---·-'~ -·-~ ----- ---..-·-···"~----- .... 
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Apart  from  slowing  down  adaptation  such  policies  also  have 
the  effect  of  exporting  econo~ic difficulties  from  one  country 
to  another.  Since  most. of  the  member  Sta~s' trade  is  within 
the  community, such  a  process  ~s  extremely  dangerous  for  the 
common  market. 
An  effective  community  policy  1n  this  area  is  of  the  utmost 
.  •  importance.  All  state  aids  which  affect  trade  between  member . 
States  must  be  approved  by  the  Commission.  They  will  only 
be  permitted  if  they  are  necessary  for: 
the  economic  development  of  disadvantaged  regions 
the  promotio1.  or  execution  of  an  important  project  of 
common  European  interest 
the  development  of  certain  econom1c  activities  or  of 
certain  econo~ic areas. 
In  any  case  such  aids  must  not  affect  trading  conditions  to  such 
an  extent  that  they  are  contrary  to  the  common  interest.  It  is 
this  balancing  of  interests  which  dominates  the  Commission's 
assessment  of  state  aids.  In  1981  and  1982,  that  is  s1nce 
I  becam~ ldSponsible  for  the  Commissions  policy  on  state  aids,  we 
have  forbidden  as  many  state  aids  as  1n  all  other  years  since 
the  common  market  was  set  up.  And,  more  important,  roughly  half 1 2 • 
the  number  of  all  notified  aids  are  adapted  before  obtaining 
~he CommissionL  approval.  Let  me  illustrate  on  approach  with 
an  exemple 
The  French  government  granted  an  aid  to  the  textile  and  clothing 
industry.  It  was  a  disguised  aid ·since  it'took  the  form  of·a 
reduction  of  social  security  contributions.  In  granting  this 
aid  no  account  was  taken  of  the  competitive  situation  in  the 
Community  nor  was  it part  of  a  restructuring  of  the  French 
industry  1n  the  Community  interest.  The  Commission  therefore 
declared  it to  be  incompatible  with  the  Common  Market. 
In  order  to  guide  Governments  (and  undertakings)  on  what  state 
aids  do  carry  out  a  useful  economic  purpose  and  are  in  the 
interest  of  the  Common  market,  we  have  issued  guide  lines  for 
regional  aids  and  for  sectoral  aids  1n  Textiles,  s~~e~,  ship-
~  . 
building  and  even  for  environmental  protection~  Others  are  being 
elaborated. 
2.  Prohibition  Decisions  again~ Und~rtaking 
It  has  been  the  Commission's  constant  policy  to  prohibit  under 
Articles  85  and  -~6  all  attempts  by  undertakings  to  ~istort 
existing  competition  by  agreement,  concerted  practices  and 
abuses  of  dominant  positions.  This  has  for  a  long  time  been  the 
~rea of  the  Commission's  competition  policy  which  has  attracted 
the  most  attention.  For  that  reason,  I  limit  myself  to  mentioning 
this  important  part  of  the  competition  policy  without  entering 13. 
into details  or  enumerating  well  known  examples. 
3.  Merger  Control 
There  is,however,  a  major  ga;  in  the  Commission
1 s  structures. 
.  fu  .  c  • 
There  is  as  yet  no  effective  strument  to  control  ~ergers.Mergers 
can  of  ~ourse often  have  a  positive  effect  on  competitive 
structures  but  some  have  a  detrimental  effect  and  can  even 
eliminate  competition  altogether.  That  is  why  a  European 
instrument  for  the  control  of  mergers  is  urgently  needed.  It 
is  now  ten  years  since  the  Commission  proposed  a  merger  control 
regulation  to  ~he Council  but  unfortunately  no  progress  has  yet 
been  made  despite  a  modification  of  the  proposal  by  the  CoQmission 
in  1981  to  take  account  of  the  main  objections  ~~e  Council 
seemed  to  have. 
We  do  of  course  have  the  limited  merger  control  possibilities 
of  Article  86.as  established  in  the  Continental  Can  case.  But 
a  regulation  is  still needed  because  the  application  of  Article  86 
has  the  following  problems. 
'  ; 
there  1s  no  requirement  of  prior  notification 
Regulation  17  procedures  are  too  slow 
one  of,the  undeftakings  must  already  be  1n  a  dominant 
position  (Article  86  cannot,  under  present  case  law,  be 
used  to  prevent  the  creation  of  a  dominant  position) 
muse  have  "practical  elimination"  of  Competition  too  late 
Industrial  policy  and  other  objectives  cannot  be  taken  into 
).l """'  A  - ,_  .: ..- 1  -..  0  r.  ~ ~ ' '  -··  .......... _  __..  ___  ...  -------·--~-'"""'-- ...... ------···-------·-- -~  ....  - .... . 
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B.  The  Use  of  Competition  Policy  to  Create  the  Necessary  Conditio~s 
for  Effective  Competition 
I  now  come  to  the  second  category  of  means  by  which  we  are  using 
competition  policy  to  help  resolve  our  economic  difficulties. 
These  are  the  means  we  are  using  to  create  or.improve  the  neces-
sary  c'onditions  for  effective  competition. with  the  common  market. 
1.  Export  Prohibition 
The  oost  celebrated  example  of  the  use  of com?etit ion  policy  in 
this  more  active\way  is  our  very  strict attitude  to  export  bans 
within  the  common  market  and  to  all measures  with  discourage  or 
impede  "parallel"  imports.  The  Commission  accepts  that  the 
creation  of  the  single  internal  market  has  not  yet  been 
cocipleted  and  that  differences  in  national  markets  persist  - the 
most  str~king being  differences  in  price  levels.  Parallel  imports 
are  an  important  equalising  influence  which  prevent  these  price 
differentials  becoming  too  l?rge  by  transferring  competitive 
pressure  from  one  member  state  to  another. 
The  single  market  is  a  most  important  precondition  for  competition 
to  carry  out  its  function  of  improving  econom1c  efficiency  and 
performance  on'a  community-wide  scale. 
European  ~Jdertakings need  a  large  internal  market  to  achieve 
the  same  economics  of  scale  and  therefore  have  the  same  incentives 
to  invest  and  take  risks  as  their  American  and  Japanese  compe-
titors. -··  ··-··--~~  ... -~. _  .. -.... ~-- .~  ··~------ --··- _____  .. ----· 
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2.  Exemptions 
Another  means  by  which  competition  policy  is  being  used  to  create 
or  enhance  the  conditions  necessary  f~r  effective  competiti~n 'is  by 
the  granting  of  exemptions  to  procompetitive  agreements.  The  most 
efficient  way  of  doing  this  is  by  means  of  block  exemptiDn 
r e g u l: a t i o n s • 
Thus  the  block  exem~tion for  specialisation  a~reements  which  has 
. 
just  been  renewed  and  extended  allows  small  and  medium-sized 
companies  to  achieve  economics  of  scale  by  concentrating  various 
parts  of  their  production  at  different  plants  belonging  to  them, 
a  third  party  or  a  joint  venture. 
Antoher  example  is  the  block  exemption  for  exclusive  distribution 
agreements  which  encourages  the  penetration  of  new  markets  by  all 
exclusivity  and  the  imposition  of  other  obligations  designed  to 
improve  the  chanc~s  of  the  successful  launch  of  the  product  on  the 
new  market. 
,. 
Antoher  block  exemption  which  is  badly  needed  and  which  is  now 
be i ·n g  p r e p a r e d  r e l a t e s  t o  R  e s e a r c h  a n d  D  e v e t o p m  e n t •  T  h e  C  o m  m  i s s i on 
recognises  that  the  development  of  new  technologies  is  ~ssential 
for  t~e  achievement  of  new  long-term  economic  growth.  The  expense 
and  the  risks  involved  in  carrying  out  Research  and  Development 
in  these  fields  can  oft~n  be  reduced  if  several  undertakings 
cooperate.  The  Commission  encourages  this  sort  of  cooperation  in 
appropriate  cases  and  i\  preparing  a  block  exemption  to  exempt 
it  and  lay  down  the  conditions  and  framework  in  which  it  can  occur. SME's 
A common  feature  of  the  Commission's  block  exemption  regulations  . 
in specialisation 'and  exclusive dealing  is  the  speed  and  favourable 
treatment  accorded  to  small  and  medium  sized  undertakings. 
The  Commission  recognises  the  enormous  importance  of  small  and  medium 
sized undertakings  for  the  Community  economy.  Th~y constitute  the 
most  dynamic  and  adaptable  part  of  the  economy  and  are  especially 
important  in  times  of  economic  change.  Small  and  medium  sized 
undertakings  provide  employment  for  a  large  proportion of  the 
Community  workforce. 
The  Commission  is therefore  always  careful  to  take  account  of  the 
special  needs  of  small  and  medium  sized  undertakings  in  the 
formulation  of  its competition  policy. 
.I. 
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This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  C~mission doesn•t  recognize 
that  cooperation  of  larger  undertakings  in  thes~  fields  can  be 
desirable.  The  impact  of  their  coopera~ion on  the  structure  o~ the 
market  is  in  many  cases  so  important  that  we  have  to  limit  the 
block  exemptions  to  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises. 
Crisis  Cartels 
The  Commission  can  also  use  the  exemption  procedure  to  help 
undertakings  restructure  and  adapt  themselves  where  they  are 
faced  with  structural  overcapacity. 
Structural  overcapacity  exists  where  over  a  prolonged  period  the 
undertakings  concerned  have  experienced  a  significant  reduction 
in  their  rated  of  capacity  utilization,  a  drop  in  output  and 
substantial  _perating  losses  and  there  appears  to  be  not  prospeLt 
of  improvement  in  the  medium-term. 
Structural  overcapacity  may  result  from  entry  on  to  the  market  of 
new  products  or  from  erroneous  demand·  trend  forecasts  which  gave 
rise  to  excessi~e  investment. 
I  a  mar:. e t  economy' each  under t a k in g  must  assess  for  i t s e l f  whet her 
and  at  what  point  such  overcapacity  becomes  economically  insuppor-
table;  it  also  has  ~  decide  on  the  measures  needed  to  reduce 
this  overcapacity.  Competition  policy  must  ensure  that  this  reorga-
nization  process  is  not  impeded  and  occurs  as  sm6othly  and 
quickly  as  possible. 
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Thus  the  Commission  will  approve  agreements  which  in  order  to  co~-' 
bat  structural  problems,  provide  a.coordinated  reduction  of  over-
capacity. 
.. 
However,  the  Com~ission must  oppose  agreements  which,  in  attempting 
to  combat  structural  problems,  provide  for  price  and  quota  fixing, 
and  which  make  no  coritribution  to  solving  structural  problems. 
It  must  also  oppose  the  grant  of  state  aid  designed  to  maintain 
artificially or  to  increase  excess  capacity. 
A  sectoral  agreement  providing  for  a  coordinated  reduction  of 
overcapacity  in  an  entire  industry  can  be  regarded  as  compatible 
with  the  rules  of  competition  where  : 
(i)  its  only  objective  is  to  reduce  structural  overcapacity 
without  serving  at  the  same  time,  to  fix  or  control 
quantiti~es  produced,  quantities  delivered  or  prices; 
its  duration  is  restricted.  Certainly  that  their  agreement 
~ill  come  to  an  end  in  the  near  future  makes  the  under-
takings  concerned  take  account  of  the  fact  that  in  due 
course  they  will  once  again  become  full-blown  competitors. 
( i i i  )  it  provides  for  no  protectionist  ~easures  vis-~vis outside 
competiti~~,  notably,  imports  from  third  countries; 
(iv)  it  contains,  fof  each  production  unit,  a  detailed,  binding 
plan  of  closures  guaranteeing  that  the  overcapacity  will 
not  merely  be  mothballed,  but  irreversibly  dismantled; 
(v)  it  guarantces·that,  during  its  application,  no  new  capacity 
~~-~-~-------~---~------------------- ·-·-··""'--~-- ·- ... __  .. _____  --·-,--·  -- ... - ........ ___  ..  - ............ 
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ring  plan  as  replacement  capacity; 
(vi)  it  provides,  if  necessary,  for  a  system  of  sanctions  to 
ensure  compliance  with  the  dismantling  plan,  under  the  sc le 
responsibility  of  the  undertakings  concerned. 
Structural  overcapacity  problems  do  not  however  always  have  to  be 
dealt  with.on  an  industry-wide  basis  entered  intu  by  most  of  the 
industry.  Often  it  i·s  not  possible  or,  indeed, _desirable  to 
obtain  the  agreement  between  all  concerned.  Bilateral  agreements 
between  large  undertakings  by  which  each  agrees  to  close  down  part 
of  its  production  capacity  and  each  agrees  to  close  down  part  of 
its  production  capacity  and  obtain  its  requirements  from  the  other 
can  have  the  same  result  and  is  exemptable  under  the  same  condi• 
tion. 
'  ; 
,. ./ 
/ 
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3.  Surveillance of  State-Owned  Undertakings 
Several  sectors  of  the  economy  which  are  dominated  by  public 
undertakings  are  characterised  by  persisting national  divisions  and. 
the  creation of  a  single  market  has  not  made  much  progress.  The 
Commission  is  anxious  to  ensure  that  public  undertakings  also 
comply  with  the  competition  rules  and  do  not  distort  competition 
do  the  detriment  of  other  undertakings.  They  are  often  in  a 
position  to  do  this·either obtaining  state aids  (possibly  1n 
disguised  form)  or  abusing  the  dominant-oositions  which  they 
often enjoy.  They also  may  affect  normal- competition  by  their 
p~rch~sing policy. 
In  order  to  control  the  state aid  problem  in  relation  to public 
undertakings,  the  Commission  has  adopted  the  Transparency 
Directive obliging  member  States  to  reveal  their financial 
relationships  with  their  public  undertakings.  The  Commission 
will  then  be  able  to determine  whether  illegal  state aids  are 
being  granted.  The  Court  of  Justice  has, I  am  pleas-_:  to  say.J 
now  confirmed  the  legality of  this directive  following  an  attar~ 
by  three  member  States  (UK,  France  and  Italy). 
The  Commission  l.vs  also  confirmed  that  public  undertakings  are 
~ubject  to  Articles  85  and  86  except  only  whAre  the application 
of  these  Articles obstructs  the  performance  of  their duties. 
Thus  we  have  rprently  adopted  a  decision against  British  Telecom 
for  restricting the  services  of  tetex  retransmission  agencies. 
Generally  the  Commission  intends  to  ensure  that  such  public 
monopolies  do  not  extend  their  market  power  into other  fields • 
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4.  Regulated  Industries 
Of  course,  public  undertakings  are  no~ the  only ones  which  have 
'  been able  to  resist  the  establishment  of  a  sing(e  market  in  the 
Community.  Insurance  and  Banking  are  two  other oligopolistic sectors 
where  undertakings  in each  member  State are  largely sheltered 
from  competition  in  other  member  States.  Here  too  the  Commission 
is  taking  steps which  will  open  up  ~hese sleepy  markets  to 
effective  competition. 
V.  Conclusion 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen~  I  have  attempted  to  explain  to  you  in 
the  short  time  available  to  me  the  Commission's  Competition 
policy. 
,J  hope  that  I  have  shown  you  that  we  are  not  blindly  pursuing 
a  competition  policy  as  an  end  in  itself.  On  the  contrary  we 
view  competition policy  as  being  of  essential  assistance 
in  the  resolution  of  our  economic .difficulties. 
~Invitation to  pose  questions_7 